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ABSTRACT
Recent scholarship has argued that the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of the press refers to speech-disseminating technology, such as the
printing press, rather than to the institutional press. This Article argues that
to protect the free press rights of authors, technological intermediaries such
as presses and internet and online service providers must be afforded
greater protection than authors for publishing and disseminating sanction-
able speech. Unless intermediaries are granted near-complete immunity,
the government will be able to censor authors collaterally by threatening to
punish intermediaries for authors' speech, forcing intermediaries to restrain
what the government cannot directly.
Specifically, this Article explores the longstanding, symbiotic relation-
ship between liberty of the press and copyright law, and argues that, even if
copyright protections are generally consistent with the Free Speech Clause,
they may violate the Free Press Clause when they motivate collateral cen-
sorship of non-copyright-infringing speech.
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I. INTRODUCTIONRECENT scholarship has argued that the Free Press Clause' of the
First Amendment protects freedom of the "press-as-technology"
rather than freedom of the "press-as-industry." 2 This freedom is
not limited to printing presses specifically, but extends to the press's
"modem equivalents" as well.3 Eugene Volokh explains that freedom of
the press "was generally seen as the right to publish using mass technol-
ogy, as opposed to the freedom of speech, which was seen at the time [of
the framing era] as focusing more on in-person speech."4 Edward Lee
similarly argues, "At its core, the freedom of the press was designed to
protect speech technology."5
Volokh and Lee's characterization echoes Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. In 1948, the Court noted, "We have no doubt that moving pictures,
like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is
guaranteed by the First Amendment."6 Then in 1978, Chief Justice Bur-
ger stated in his concurrence in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
"It is not strange that 'press,' the word for what was then the sole means
of broad dissemination of ideas and news, would be used to describe the
freedom to communicate with a large, unseen audience."7
Despite the vast theoretical reach of the Free Press Clause, its role in
judicial opinions has been limited in practice because it is seen as largely
redundant to the Free Speech Clause.8 David A. Anderson, for example,
noted that "[tihe press is protected from most government censorship,
1. "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom . . . of the press." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
2. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a
Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 459, 463 (2012); see also
David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx. L. REv. 429, 446-47, 446 n.90 (2002)
("The concept of press as journalism cannot claim a historical pedigree.... To the genera-
tion of the Framers of the First Amendment, 'the press' meant 'the printing press.' It re-
ferred less to a journalistic enterprise than to the technology of printing and the
opportunities for communication that the technology created."); Edward Lee, Freedom of
the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REv. 309, 315-16, 339-56 (2008) (arguing the "press" referred to
the printing press and that "freedom of the press" was designed to protect "speech
technology").
3. See Volokh, supra note 2, at 462.
4. Id. at 464.
5. Lee, supra note 2, at 345.
6. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948); see also Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 ("The press in its historic connotation comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.").
7. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 n.5 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
8. Volokh, supra note 2, at 477.
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libel judgments, and prior restraints not because it is the press but be-
cause the Speech Clause protects all of us from those threats."9 Indeed,
Supreme Court cases frequently refer to freedom of speech and the press
interchangeably or inconsistently.' 0 After an extensive survey of free
press cases from the twentieth century, Volokh concluded that "the Court
considers the same rules to apply interchangeably under both the Free
Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause.""
If the same rules apply under the Free Speech Clause and the Free
Press Clause, one might rightly ask whether there is any value in deter-
mining where one right ends and the other begins. Radio, film, and televi-
sion "fit more naturally in lay English within the term 'speech' rather
than 'press."1 2 On the other hand, radio, film, and television technolo-
gies are properly characterized as "speech technology," capable of reach-
ing massive numbers of people.' 3 Counter-intuitively, they qualify as the
press, alongside newspapers, books, and handbills.14 But if there is no
difference in practice between speech and press rights, why even bother
to correct the understanding of presses?
The importance of distinguishing between speech and press does not lie
within the law's treatment of a speaker or author.' 5 The treatment of a
speaker on a soapbox and the author of a handbill under the First
Amendment is identical.16 Although some sources suggest "mass commu-
nication" (as distinct from the press corps) might be more protected than
in-person speech, the evidence for this view is limited and has not been
embraced by courts.' 7
Rather, the importance of the Free Press Clause lies within the law's
treatment of technology owners and manufacturers. The party who builds
9. Anderson, supra note 2, at 430.
10. Compare, e.g., Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452 (characterizing non-journalist pamphleteers
as being protected by liberty of the press), with N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
268, 300 (1964) (characterizing signers of a published advertisement as exercising their free
speech rights). See also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (striking down
an ordinance limiting distribution of handbills as being "in conflict with the freedom of
speech and press"); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414 (1943) (striking down an ordinance
prohibiting distribution of handbills as violating free press rights); Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 160-65 (1939) (striking down an ordinance limiting distribution of circulars as
violating both free speech and free press rights).
11. Volokh, supra note 2, at 514; see also id. at 476-77 (suggesting how the coextensive
speech and press rights may have developed).
12. Volokh, supra note 2, at 477.
13. Id. at 506-15.
14. Id.
15. Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1036 (2011).
16. Anderson, supra note 2, at 430; David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23
UCLA L. REV. 77, 88, 118-19 (1975) (arguing the Press Clause is and should be construed
as redundant to the Speech Clause); Volokh, supra note 2, at 514.
17. See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455,
521-27 (1983) (discussing how the Quebec Address, Cato's Letters, the views of James
Madison, and other writings suggested more expansive understandings of free press rights
existed during the founding era); Volokh, supra note 2, at 508 (noting that Justice Powell's
concurrence in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 724 (1972), implicitly embraced the view
that "a person who gathers information for future mass communication would get a privi-
lege of some unspecified force").
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a printing press and lets anyone use it on a first-come, first-serve basis is
not engaging in any expressive activity. Nonetheless, to protect the free
press interests of those who endeavor to express themselves using tech-
nology of mass communication, technologists and technology must be
subject to protection, for which there is no direct equivalent under the
Free Speech Clause.
This Article explores the scope of the Free Press Clause as applied to
non-speaking technologists and to speech-facilitating technology. It takes
as a given that the free press refers to freedom of the press-as-technology,
rather than the press-as-industry.' 8 Also, for ease of comprehension, the
term "speaker" is used to refer to any party expressing themselves, either
orally or in writing, regardless of whether their actions are protected
under the Free Speech Clause or the Free Press Clause. Where it is neces-
sary to indicate under which clause a speaker is protected, it is specified.
Particularly, this Article considers how collateral censorship of speak-
ers, via technologies of mass communication, threatens liberty of the
press and how protections from those practices should be applied to com-
munication technologies. Parts II and III consider prohibitions on prior
restraints and discuss how rules that create incentives for collateral cen-
sorship effect a prior restraint of speech. Part IV evaluates how existing
liability regimes for speech intermediaries can fail to sufficiently protect
free press rights, and suggests an alternative method for allocating liabil-
ity for illegal speech. Finally, Part V proposes a relationship between the
Free Press Clause and copyright law, specifically considering the constitu-
tionality of § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.'9
II. HISTORY OF LIBERTY OF THE PRESS AND PRIOR
RESTRAINTS
Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers, "What signifies a
declaration that 'the liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved?'
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which
would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion?" 20 Despite Hamilton's
hyperbole, his statements were generally accurate. At the time of the
founding, "the outerlimits of liberty of the press were ill-defined and im-
properly understood." 21
18. For a more complete discussion over the meaning of the Free Press Clause, see
generally Anderson, supra note 2; Lange, supra note 16; Melville B. Nimmer, Introduc-
tion-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26
HASTINGs L.J. 639 (1975); Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975);
Volokh, supra note 2; West, supra note 15.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
20. Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: Redis-
covering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of Powers, 34 IND. L.
REv. 295, 320 (2001) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513-14 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
21. Id. at 320 & n.178 (citing LEONARD LEvy, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 348
(1985)) ("The First Amendment's injunction, that there shall be no law abridging the free-
dom of speech or press, was boldly stated if narrowly understood.").
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Nonetheless, certain elements of freedom of the press were and still are
clear. There is "wide-spread consensus" that "[1]iberty of the press must
mean, at a bare minimum, no prior restraint." 22 In his work throughout
the 1960s, Leonard Levy argued for a slightly more expansive view of the
founders' understanding of the Free Press Clause (while specifying that
he believed there was no obligation to follow their interpretation). 23 Spe-
cifically, he concluded that in addition to prohibiting prior restraints on
publication, the Clause also forbade "any Congressional regulation of the
press, whether by means of a licensing act, a tax act, or a sedition act." 24
Levy's position countered the previously popular view that "freedom of
the press was one of the key reforms for which the American Revolution
had been fought." 25 Indeed, David A. Anderson later criticized Levy's
conception of the Free Press Clause as being too narrow and lamented
that Levy's writings had "dominated discussion of [F]irst [A]mendment
history" since their publication. 26
Regardless of its breadth, scholars agree that at a minimum the Free
Press Clause forbids prior restraints on publication.27 But the contours of
"prior restraint" are themselves murky.28 English common law held that
"equity will not enjoin a libel," 29 and this view prevailed in America dur-
ing the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 30 Injunctions were pro-
hibited even after a final judgment was issued and a party was found
guilty of libel.31 Although many courts only cited the English maxim
when refusing to issue an injunction,32 a number explicitly acknowledged
22. Meyerson, supra note 20, at 320-21; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,
713 (1931) ("In determining the extent of the constitutional protection [of liberty of the
press], it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the
guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication.").
23. LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (1960).
24. LEONARD LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON, at Iv-lvii
(Leonard Levy ed., 1966).
25. Anderson, supra note 17, at 494 (citing JAMES SMITH, FREEDOM's LETTERS: THE
ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 424-30 (1956)); see also
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1964) ("The First
Amendment was written by men .. . who intended to wipe out the common law of sedition,
and make further prosecutions for criticism of the government, without any incitement to
law-breaking, forever impossible in the United States of America."); Smith, supra, at 427
("[O]ne of the objects of the American Revolution was to abolish the common law restric-
tion on liberty of the press, especially on political discussion.").
26. Anderson, supra note 17, at 495. Anderson argued that "[t]he Quebec Address[,]
'Cato's Letters,' the writings of several American editors and other dissenters, and the
views of Madison himself all suggest that broader theories [than the Blackstonian view of
liberty of the press] were indeed abroad in the land." Id. at 523; see also id. at 523-33
(describing this evidence).
27. Meyerson, supra note 20, at 295.
28. Id. at 296.
29. Id. at 308-11 (describing the refusal to enjoin defamatory statements in England).
30. Id. at 324-30 (discussing attempts to enjoin specific publications); id. at 334-35
(discussing attempts to enjoin newspapers).
31. Meyerson, supra note 20, at 334-35.
32. Id. at 329 n.233 (listing several cases in which courts "merely cited the equitable
rule without mentioning the constitutional interest in free expression").
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a relationship between the common law rule and liberty of the press.3 3
In 1931, the Supreme Court decided Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
holding that an injunction barring a newspaper from publishing or distrib-
uting "a malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper, as defined by
law" violated the federal constitution.34 However, Near failed to articu-
late a general definition of a "prior restraint."35 Was an injunction after
final judgment a prior restraint? When did legislative and executive ac-
tion qualify?
Thomas Emerson proposed a typology of prior restraints in 1955, which
included licensing schemes, injunctions, laws that forbade particular com-
munication absent compliance with standards specified in legislation, and
situations where "the restraint appears more indirect or secondary to
some other immediate objective." 36 This final type of restraint occurs,
"for example, where political views or other forms of expression are used
as a test for holding an office or position of influence."37
Michael I. Meyerson attempted to define prior restraint by trying to
articulate permissible, subsequent punishments for speech.38 Focusing on
the importance of separation of powers in the federal system, he sug-
gested a recipe for creating constitutional, subsequent punishments for
illegal speech. 39 "First, the legislature enacts a general law, defining the
prohibited speech." 40 Speech must then be communicated and action
33. See Meyerson, supra note 20, at 325-30 (citing Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24,
26 (N.Y. Ch. 1939) (stating it could not assume jurisdiction "without infringing upon liberty
of the press")); see also Willis v. O'Connell, 231 F. 1004, 1010 (S.D. Ala. 1916); Citizens'
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 F. 553, 556 (M.D.
Ala. 1909); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. S.D. Retail Merchs.' & Hardware Dealers' Ass'n,
150 F. 413, 418 (D.S.D. 1907); Balliet v. Cassidy, 104 F. 704, 706 (D. Or. 1900); State ex rel.
Liversey v. Judge of Civil Dist. Court, 34 La. Ann. 741, 742 (La. 1882) (holding that an
injunction against publishing was unconstitutional); Howell v. Bee Publ'g Co., 158 N.W.
358 (Neb. 1916); Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 64 N.E. 163, 166 (N.Y. 1902) (enjoining
libels violates freedom of the press and the right to a jury trial); Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke
Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804, 805 (Mo. 1892) (enjoining libels would violate freedom of the
press and the right to a jury); N.Y. Juvenile Guardian Soc'y v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly 188, 188
(N.Y. Ct. Com. PI. 1877) (issuing a temporary injunction against an alleged libel would
violate the New York Constitution's guarantee of freedom of speech); Life Ass'n of Am. v.
Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173, 176-77 (1876) (stating that issuing an injunction would violate
the Missouri Constitution's guarantee of free speech); Strang v. Biggers, 252 S.W. 826, 826
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1923, no writ).
34. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 712, 722-23 (1931).
35. Meyerson, supra note 20, at 338; see also John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior
Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 434 (1983) ("Moreover, continuing uncertainty as to what is
actually meant by 'prior restraint' and the accelerating tendency to invoke that phrase in a
wide variety of dissimilar cases have undermined whatever usefulness the doctrine may
have had in explaining or predicting results.").
36. Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
648, 655-56 (1955); see also Jeffries, supra note 35, at 421 (describing Emerson's article as
one of the "most influential" at defining prior restraints). Emerson believed the third and
fourth types of prior restraint had less potential for abuse and were not always unconstitu-
tional. Emerson, supra, at 671.
37. Emerson, supra note 36, at 656.
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brought against the speaker by the executive branch or private action.41
Finally, the judiciary must rule "on the legality of the communication." 4 2
With this structure in mind, Meyerson defined prior restraint in two
parts:
(1) A "prior restraint" occurs whenever judges or executive branch
personnel are authorized to take notice of specific expression in-
tended for communication, rather than that which has actually been
communicated; (2) For those rare cases when the Constitution per-
mits the regulation of expression before it is communicated, a "prior
restraint" also occurs if the judiciary can initiate enforcement or the
executive can make a final determination of illegality. 43
Supreme Court cases discussing prior restraints in different contexts
paint a similar picture. For example, Freedman v. Maryland considered a
statute that required films to be approved by a board of censors before
being shown. 4 4 The Court held that
a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film
to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if . .. the burden of
proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the cen-
sor. . . . [and] the exhibitor [is] assured, by statute or authoritative
judicial construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief pe-
riod, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the
film. 45
Notably, the Court insisted that the procedure "assure a prompt final
judicial decision." 46 Near and Freedman fit two common fact patterns in
"prior restraint" cases-cases that consider injunctions against publica-
tion and cases where parties are required to acquire licenses or permis-
sion before speaking or publishing. 47 However, there are other ways to
effect prior restraints on the press.
III. COLLATERAL CENSORSHIP AS PRIOR RESTRAINT
There are more opportunities to censor "the press" than to censor
"speech" alone. In-person speech involves speakers, listeners, and who-
ever controls the location the speech takes place in. Speaking through
tools of mass communication-in other words, exercising one's freedom
under the Free Press Clause-however, necessarily involves a greater
41. Id.
42. Id. at 339-40.
43. Id. at 340.
44. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52-53 (1965).
45. Id. at 58-59.
46. Id. at 59.
47. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (disallowing an in-
junction on publishing the classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Pro-
cess on Viet Nam Policy," better known as the "Pentagon Papers"); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-53 (1938) (holding that a statute requiring permission from the
Griffin City Manager before distributing literature violated liberty of the press); see also
Emerson, supra note 36, at 655-56 (describing licensing and injunctions as forms of prior
restraint and licensing systems as "the clearest form").
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number of intermediaries. Traditionally, these intermediaries are labeled
"publishers" and "distributers," or "publishers" and "secondary publish-
ers." 48 Justice Scalia highlighted the opportunity intermediaries provide
would-be censors in his concurrence in McConnell v. FEC:
An author may write a novel, but he will seldom publish and dis-
tribute it himself. A freelance reporter may write a story, but he will
rarely edit, print, and deliver it to subscribers. To a government bent
on suppressing speech, this mode of organization presents opportuni-
ties: Control any cog in the machine, and you can halt the whole
apparatus. License printers, and it matters little whether authors are
still free to write. Restrict the sale of books, and it matters little who
prints them. Predictably, repressive regimes have exploited these
principles by attacking all levels of the production and dissemination
of ideas.49
In light of the opportunities that intermediaries-and specifically tech-
nologies of mass communication-provide to censors, the constitutionally
permissible punishments for presses and their modern-day equivalents
should differ from the permissible punishments for original speakers. This
is needed to guarantee speakers-through-the-press the same constitu-
tional freedoms as in-person speakers.50
Take for example a law that would punish both the author and pub-
lisher for writing and publishing defamatory statements against an elected
official. Assume the publisher is a vanity press that will publish anything
that an author pays it to and that the author has written a nondefamatory
book criticizing a politician. Although the book is truthful, the vanity
press may see that the book criticizes a politician, and out of an abun-
dance of caution and desire to avoid litigation, decline to publish the
book. 51 When a speaker and the owner of a technology of mass communi-
cation share the same liability, a censoring effect can result if the technol-
ogy owner refuses to publish the speech out of concern for its. own well-
being, especially when it lacks the same positive incentives to communi-
cate as the original speaker. 52
Meyerson coined the term "collateral censorship" to describe this phe-
nomenon.53 "Collateral censorship occurs when one private party A has
the power to control speech by another private party B, the government
threatens to hold A liable based on what B says, and A then censors B's
48. See Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 293, 309-11 (2011).
49. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 251 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 50 (2010); see also Lovell, 303
U.S. at 452 ("Liberty of circulating is as essential to [freedom of the press] as liberty of
publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value." (quot-
ing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877))).
50. See Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying
the "Speaker" Within the New Media, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 79, 117 (1995).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 113.
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speech to avoid liability." 54 Because B has an interest in promoting her
own speech that A lacks, A will likely be more willing to censor B than B
would be to self-censor.55
Collateral censorship can take two forms. In one, the censoring party
tries to deter the speaker through punishment. 56 For example, to avoid
the creation of a hostile work environment, an employer might forbid
certain forms of speech and punish employees who disobey.57 While the
prohibited speech is punished after it is uttered, the employer does not
directly have the power to prevent the speech from occurring
beforehand.58
In other circumstances, a censoring party has the power to directly pre-
vent speech from ever being communicated, despite attempts by the
speaker to reach an audience.59 This is the case with intermediaries such
as publishers and distributors, or conceived differently, technologies of
mass communication such as presses.60 When the vanity press refuses to
print an author's work out of fear of liability or prosecution, the author's
speech is prevented, even over her objections. 61 This constitutes a prior
restraint on her speech. Depending on the nature of the law, the author
may have considerable difficulty finding a printer for her book, effec-
tively denying her the ability to exercise her rights under the Free Press
Clause.
Importantly, the censor's actions in a collateral censorship situation are
motivated by a desire to avoid legal liability, not by a private prefer-
ence. 62 A wholly private press may choose not to print any material with-
out raising First Amendment concerns.63
Courts have not explicitly recognized collateral censorship as a cate-
gory of behavior that raises First Amendment concerns." However, this
phenomenon has been acknowledged without being named. In addition
to Justice Scalia's comment in McConnell, the Supreme Court decision
Smith v. California also considered the role of intermediaries in the dis-
semination of speech. 65 There, a bookseller was convicted under a local
ordinance that made it unlawful "for any person to have in his possession
54. J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2295,2298
(1999).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2297-98.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Wendy Seltzer dubbed this phenomenon "prior restraint by proxy." See Wendy
Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright's Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects on the DMCA
on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 177, 199-200 (2010) (citing Seth F.
Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the
Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 65 (2006)).
60. See Balkin, supra note 54, at 2298.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
64. See Balkin, supra note 54, at 2298. No state or federal cases appearing on Westlaw
as of June 2, 2013, have used the term "collateral censorship" in any context.
65. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1960).
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any obscene or indecent writing, (or) book . . . in any place of business
where ... books ... are sold or kept for sale." 66 The Court struck down
the ordinance, recognizing that imposing strict liability on the bookseller
would result in his "tend[ing] to restrict the books he sells to those he has
inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon the
distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature."67
The Court was concerned with the problem of collateral censorship-that
the bookseller would censor others' speech by refusing to sell books in
order to avoid his own criminal liability.6 8 The bookseller's incentive to
over-censor would also be compounded by a "scaling" problem.69 In
other words, as the number of potential books to distribute increased, the
bookseller would lose his ability to both comply with the law and keep his
bookshop open. 70 Because a bookseller could only read a small number
of the books he might sell, he would not be able to make an individual-
ized decision about most books based on their actual content." "The
bookseller's limitation in the amount of reading material with which he
could familiarize himself, and his timidity in the face of his absolute crimi-
nal liability, thus would tend to restrict the public's access to forms of the
printed word which the State could not constitutionally suppress di-
rectly." 72 Although Smith did not specify when a distributor could consti-
tutionally be punished for selling offensive material, the common law of
torts provides that distributors "are generally not held liable for the con-
tent they distribute unless they know or have reason to know of its tor-
tious or illegal nature."73 As in Smith, distributors are "under no duty to
examine" the material they offer for sale. 74 Although the law does not
distinguish between different types of distributors, "no one seems to have
sued a library for defamation in [the twentieth] century[,]" and "no
American appears ever to have recovered for defamation from a book-
seller or distributor not controlled by the primary publisher."75
66. Id. at 148 (quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. at 153.
68. Id. at 153-54.
69. A scaling problem occurs when legal compliance "doesn't scale" as the number of
tasks a party must undertake to successfully comply increases. For example, it would be
possible for the bookseller to personally review ten books, but not ten thousand, before
putting them on sale. Similarly, as the number of some types of patents increases, inventors
cannot sort through them all to make sure they are not accidentally violating them. Some
legal requirements which are feasible when faced with a small number of "inputs" can
become impossible to comply with as the information a party must process increases. See
generally Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8).
70. Id.
71. Smith, 361 U.S. at 153.
72. Id. at 153-54.
73. Davis S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 Lov.
L.A. L. REV. 373, 397-98 (2010) (citing Tacket v. General Motors Corp., 836 F.2d 1042,
1046-47 (7th Cir. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1977)).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) cmt. d.
75. Loftus E. Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for Def-
amation Posted by Others, 22 CONN. L. REV. 203, 227 (1989).
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IV. INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY AND FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS
Collateral censorship occurs any time an intermediary-someone be-
tween an author and her audience-faces liability for an author's
speech.76 Often this intermediary controls a technology of mass commu-
nication, such as a printing press, a television network, or a webpage that
users can post content on, such as YouTube or Facebook.77 When, if ever,
are laws that motivate collateral ownership constitutionally permissible?
Section A of this Part examines existing models of intermediary liabil-
ity and how those models sometimes encourage collateral censorship and
fail to embody the values of a free press. Drawing from this analysis and
related scholarship, Section B proposes a method for understanding
speaker and intermediary liability that limits the potential for collateral
censorship, is technology-neutral, and is consistent with the values of the
Free Press Clause.
A. THE OLD MODEL: PUBLISHER AND DISTRIBUTOR LIABILITY
Under traditional defamation law, publishers and speakers were gener-
ally liable for libel, while distributors only faced liability if they knew or
had reason to know they were distributing defamatory content.78 Thus,
publishers had significant incentive to pressure authors to skirt around
potentially illegal material, but distributors were relatively protected, as
was the bookseller in Smith v. California.79 From a "least cost avoider"
perspective of allocating liability, as well as one concerned with funda-
mental fairness, this model was somewhat intuitively appealing when a
publisher chose and edited the material it printed. Unlike the bookseller
in Smith and other distributors, publishers who edited material might not
suffer from a scaling problem. They would presumably be able to check
all submissions for defamatory or obscene content because, by assump-
tion, they already had the resources to read every published piece for
other reasons, such as to check grammar and improve the writing style.80
However, as technologies of mass communication changed, the previ-
ously clear distinction between publishers and distributors diminished.8'
In particular, websites that host outside content could be seen as publish-
ing someone's work, distributing someone's work, or both.82
76. Balkin, supra note 54, at 2298.
77. Wu, supra note 48, at 299-300.
78. See Ardia, supra note 73, at 397-98.
79. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154-55 (holding bookseller not liable for selling
an obscene book).
80. See Ardia, supra note 73, at 397 ("The theory behind [publisher] liability is that a
publisher has the knowledge, opportunity, and ability to exercise editorial control over the
content of its publications."); id. at 398 ("The key distinction in the common law between a
publisher and distributer is that a publisher inherently has knowledge of the content it is
publishing, while a distributor does not.").




Two early cases involving defamation on the Internet suggested that
publisher liability would be imposed on online service providers if the
provider exercised editorial control over the offending speech.83 In
Cubby v. CompuServe Inc., the court determined that an online service
provider, CompuServe, was merely a distributor of the content on its bul-
letin boards." The court noted the defamatory content's publisher
"upload[ed] the text of [the content] into CompuServe's data banks and
ma[de] it available to .. . subscribers simultaneously. CompuServe ha[d]
no more editorial control over such a publication than does a public li-
brary, book store, or newsstand."85 The court also acknowledged the scal-
ing problem inherent in imposing publisher liability on CompuServe by
stating "it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine every
publication it carries for potentially defamatory statements than it would
be for any other distributor to do so." 8 6
In contrast, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. declared the
online service provider, Prodigy, a publisher of defamatory content that
appeared on one of its bulletin board.87 In the court's view, the "critical
issue" in the case was whether Prodigy "exercised sufficient editorial con-
trol over its computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the
same responsibilities as a newspaper."88 Relying on the reasoning in
Cubby, Prodigy argued that it was impracticable for board moderators to
manually review all postings for defamatory contact because of the vol-
ume-about 60,000 a day at the time of the decision. 89 Prodigy conceded,
however, that board moderators could remove content that violated its
guidelines.90
Despite the reality that Prodigy's staff could not read every posted
message, the court distinguished Prodigy from CompuServe on two
grounds.9' First, Prodigy "held itself out to the public and its members as
controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards."92 Second, Prod-
igy used an "automatic software screening program" and instituted guide-
83. Ardia, supra note 73, at 406-08.
84. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
85. Id. (footnote omitted).
86. Id. ("Obviously, the national distributor of hundreds of periodicals has no duty to
monitor each issue of every periodical it distributes." (quoting Lerman v. Flynt Distrib.
Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984))).
87. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1995), superseded by statute, Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56, as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 52 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y.
2011).
88. Id. at *3.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *4.
92. Id. Prodigy "held itself out as an online service that exercised editorial control over
the content of messages posted on its computer bulletin boards, thereby expressly differen-
tiating itself from its competition and expressly likening itself to a newspaper." Id. at *2. In
one article, it stated,
We make no apology for pursuing a value system that reflects the culture of
millions of American families we aspire to serve. Certainly no responsible
newspaper does less when it chooses the type of advertising it publishes, the
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lines that bulletin board moderators were required to enforce.93 The
court concluded that based on the use of automatic screening and by em-
powering moderators to delete messages for "offensiveness" and "bad
taste," Prodigy was exercising editorial control over its messages and
qualified as a publisher of bulletin board content, rather than a distribu-
tor.9 4 "Prodigy's conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial con-
trol, has opened itself to a greater liability than CompuServe and other
computer networks that make no such choice." 9 5
Cubby and Stratton Oakmont together implied that two providers, en-
gaged in exactly the same behavior, could be held to wildly different stan-
dards of liability based on whether they exerted any degree of control,
automatic or manual, over the content that reached their subscribers.96
Consequently, online service providers had the incentive to ignore ob-
scenity or tortious speech that appeared on their bulletin boards to avoid
liability for any illegal speech that they failed to locate.
House Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden sought to
change these incentives by proposing an amendment to the Communica-
tions Decency Act, 9 7 which was codified as 47 U.S.C. § 230.98 Section 230
aimed to protect "'good samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive
material." 99 It stated, "No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider." 10o It further speci-
fied that service providers would not be liable for "restrict[ing] access to
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable" or "enabl[ing] or mak[ing] available to information con-
tent providers or others the technical means to restrict access" to such
letters it prints, the degree of nudity and unsupported gossip its editors
tolerate.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. at *4.
94. Id.
95. Id. at *5.
96. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton
Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
97. The Supreme Court ruled that portions of § 223 of the Communications Decency
Act violated the First Amendment in Reno v. ACLU, but § 230 was not altered in that
decision. See 521 U.S. 844, 883 (1997). For a more detailed discussion of the Communica-
tions Decency Act's history, see Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's
Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49
FED. COMM. L.J. 51 (1996) (cited in Ardia, supra note 73, at 409 n.178).
98. See Ardia, supra note 73, at 410. Section 230 lists among its policy objectives, "to
encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what infor-
mation is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other
interactive computer services" and "to remove disincentives for the development and utili-
zation of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their chil-
dren's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material." 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3), (4)
(2006); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Congress
enacted § 230 to remove the disincentives to selfregulation created by the Stratton
Oakmont decision.").
99. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
100. Id. § 230(c)(1).
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material. 01 Cases that followed generally agreed that § 230 granted im-
munity to distributors of sanctionable speech as well as publishers.102
Section 230 grants greater protection to technology intermediaries on
the Internet than is recognized for publishers and distributors of printed
materials. 03 The New York Times is liable as a publisher for the letters to
the editor it chooses to run in its print edition, but under § 230, it is not
liable for online comments that appear on NYTimes.com. 104
Section 230 created such extensive statutory protection for service
providers that any inquiry about the constitutional limits of intermediary
liability on the Internet was all but cut off.105 But to what degree would
the Free Press Clause protect internet speech technologies in the absence
of § 230? What protections should it provide to other speech-disseminat-
ing technologies, old and new, that are not covered?
Cubby, Stratton Oakmont, and Smith all tried to delineate when liabil-
ity would be appropriate, but these decisions failed to fully address the
threat of collateral censorship and to intelligibly distinguish between dif-
ferent types of intermediaries.106
Cubby and Stratton Oakmont illustrate the difficulty in distinguishing
between publishers and distributors.10 7 Traditionally, the distinction was
easy because publishers made copies and distributors moved those copies
around. However, hinging the distinction on "copying" is problematic in
a digital environment. Being the party that copied a work was once a
rough proxy for having the kind of intimate, editing relationship with a
work that publisher liability tried to capture. In the absence of "copying"
being a useful distinction, the courts had a more difficult time locating the
sine que non that distinguished a publisher from a distributor.
The distinction between publisher and distributor on the Internet could
have been made well, but it was not, largely because the determination
101. Id. § 230(c)(2). Subparagraph B technically states that providers shall not be held
liable for "any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers
or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1)."
However, it is accepted that "paragraph (1)" should have referred to the material de-
scribed in subparagraph A. See Id. § 230 n.1.
102. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332 (holding distributor liability "is merely a subset, or a
species, of publisher liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by § 230"); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) ("Any attempt to distinguish between 'pub-
lisher' liability and notice-based 'distributor' liability and to argue that [s]ection 230 was
only intended to immunize the former would be unavailing."); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146
P.3d 510, 519 (Cal. 2006) ("Given that 'distributors' are also known as 'secondary publish-
ers,' there is little reason to believe Congress felt it necessary to address them separately.
There is even less reason to suppose that Congress intended to immunize 'publishers' but
leave 'distributors' open to liability .....
103. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
104. Id. § 230(c)(2).
105. See generally id. § 230.
106. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 172 (1959); Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776
F. Supp. 135, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL
323710, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), superseded by statute, Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y.,
Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011).
107. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *7; Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 144.
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that Prodigy should be liable as a publisher was flawed.108 In Stratton
Oakmont, the judge noted that Prodigy screened messages, both person-
ally and automatically, and exercised the rights to eliminate messages that
it found objectionable according to its guidelines.109 For these reasons,
the judge found that Prodigy was acting more like a publisher than a dis-
tributor.110 But distributors make these kinds of "include or exclude"
judgments all the time. The classic distributor is a newsstand or a book-
store.111 Bookstores and newsstands can choose to be family-friendly or
racy, to only stock publications that they believe are well-written or popu-
lar, or to only stock publications that deal with certain topics, such as
travel or science fiction. Making these choices is inherent to being a
bookstore or a newsstand. There are simply too many writings in the
world to sell, so a bookstore must decide "yay or nay." Prodigy did the
same thing by empowering board leaders to delete messages, but not to
change the content of a message.112 In this respect, Prodigy was acting
more like a distributor because it was not actively editing the speech of
others, as many publishers do.113
But even if the Stratton Oakmont court had conceived of Prodigy's lia-
bility in this way, it is hardly clear that distributor liability is sufficiently
speech-protective to satisfy the First Amendment. Although Smith did
not specify what a distributor must know to face liability for distributing
illegal works,114 tort law requires a distributor to "kn[ojw or ha[ve] rea-
son to know" of a work's tortious or illegal nature before facing liabil-
ity."15 But as the Fourth Circuit recognized in Zeran v. America Online, a
§ 230 case, simply requiring parties to notify a distributor of allegedly de-
famatory or illegal content creates speech-chilling incentives for high-vol-
ume distributors and motivates aggrieved parties to notify those
distributors and claim defamation "[w]henever one [i]s displeased with
the speech of another party."116
Each notification would require a careful yet rapid investigation of the
circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment con-
cerning the information's defamatory character, and an on-the-spot edito-
rial decision whether to risk liability by allowing the continued
publication of that information. . . . [T]he sheer number of postings on
interactive computer services would create an impossible burden in the
Internet context.. . . Because service providers would be subject to liabil-
108. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
109. Id. at *4-5
110. Id. at *4.
111. See, e.g., Smith, 361 U.S. at 148.
112. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4. Moreover, Prodigy and CompuServe's
editorial power was actually quite similar. "While CompuServe may decline to carry a
given publication altogether, in reality, once it does decide to carry a publication, it will
have little or no editorial control over that publication's contents." Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at
140.
113. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
114. Smith, 361 U.S. at 152-53.
115. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc. 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir.1997).
116. Id. at 333.
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ity only for the publication of information, and not for its removal, they
would have a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notifica-
tion, whether the contents were defamatory or not." 7
Zeran ultimately held that America Online was shielded from liability
under § 230, but its analysis of the speech-chilling risks of distributor lia-
bility is not limited to online service providers.118 Zeran highlighted the
scaling problem distributors face, which the Court in Smith v. California
also expressed concern about.119 When only notice is needed to put an
intermediary at risk of liability, an intermediary with a low staff-to-con-
tent ratio will be incentivized to stop distributing content because it will
lack the necessary resources to make informed decisions about each piece
of allegedly illegal speech.120 This problem can occur with off-line pub-
lishers as well as distributors and online intermediaries. Self-publishing
outfits, for instance, print everything from high school newspapers to rad-
ical groups' manifestos to local interest books. As printing becomes tech-
nologically easier, fewer staff members need to participate in the printing
process. One can easily imagine a printer where some publications are
never seen or read by its staff.
The automatization of printing raises a scaling problem for publishers
as well as distributors. This is particularly problematic for publishers, who
do not even need notice of illegal speech to be liable for it. The original
theory behind publisher liability was that "a publisher has the knowledge,
opportunity, and ability to exercise editorial control over the content of
its publications."121 But more and more often that is no longer true.
The publisher and distributor categories of speech are not sufficiently
speech-protective. Protecting speech technologies requires not treating
publishers as speakers and not forcing distributors to withhold publica-
tions upon a mere peppercorn of notice that a work contains illegal
speech.
B. A NEW MODEL: SPEAKER AND PRESs LIABILITY
Numerous scholars have proposed alternative approaches for interme-
diary liability.122 Michael I. Meyerson suggested, in an online context,
only finding liability when a service provider "has had a high 'degree of
... involvement' in the illegal speech." 23 Felix Wu supports intermediary
immunity except when "intermediaries are actually original speakers, and




120. Id. at 331.
121. See Ardia, supra note 73, at 397.
122. See Meyerson, supra note 50, at 123; Wu, supra note 48, at 379.
123. Meyerson, supra note 50, at 123 (footnote omitted) (quoting Enforcement of
Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene Mater-
ials, 2 FCC Rcd. 2819, 2820 (1987)).
124. Wu, supra note 48, at 349.
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imposed on the intermediary is not one that could be sensibly imposed on
the original speaker," 125 such as holding an intermediary liable for induc-
ing illegal speech.126
Jack Balkin considered the constitutionality of collateral censorship in
an employment setting. His essay discussed employer liability for main-
taining a hostile work environment-or, rather, for permitting its employ-
ees to engage in a variety of speech and actions that together create a
hostile environment.127 Balkin addressed collateral censorship in a more
general context: person-to-person speech in an office does not raise free
press concerns, and employers are not technologies of mass communica-
tion.128 Nonetheless, Balkin's reasoning can be analogized to technology
intermediaries.129
Balkin reframed the collateral censorship issue, claiming that "[t]he
question we should ask is whether it makes sense, given the purposes of a
regulatory regime, and the kind of harm that the legislature has a right to
prevent, to treat the private censor and the private speaker as the 'same
speaker' for purposes of First Amendment law."' 30 Balkin did not suggest
that the censor and speaker must literally be engaging in the same speech,
but appealed to principles of respondeat superior-that is, where "the law
is entitled to treat [the two parties] as if they were one, and to hold the
first liable for what the second does."131 Balkin identified three relevant
considerations that could justify collateral censorship: the censor's right
to control the speech of the private speaker, whether the censor and
speaker are collectively producing a harm or danger of harm, and the
censor's ability to mitigate the harm caused by the speaker.132 Ultimately,
in Balkin's view, "collateral censorship is most acceptable from a First
Amendment standpoint when vicarious liability is most acceptable, and it
is least acceptable from a First Amendment standpoint when vicarious
liability is least acceptable." 33
The views of Balkin, Meyerson, and Wu, as well as the judges and jus-
tices who decided Smith, Cubby, Stratton Oakmont, and the § 230 cases,
all point towards a view of intermediary liability that is technology-inde-
pendent and that fits neatly within the Free Press Clause.134 It also jetti-
125. Id. at 297.
126. Id. at 344-45. Notably, Wu is not claiming that liability is appropriate when liabil-
ity cannot be "sensibly" imposed on the original speaker because the original speaker is
difficult to identify or locate. See id. at 344-49.
127. Balkin, supra note 54, at 2297-98.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2295.
130. Id. at 2300.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2301.
133. Id.
134. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 147 (1959); Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776
F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton Oakmont. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL
323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), superseded by statute, Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y.,
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sons the outmoded distinction between publishers and distributors.13 5
There are two relevant parties in free press cases: the speaker and the
press. By censoring the press, one censors the speaker. As a result, prior
restraints on the press are not allowed. But by subjecting presses to sub-
sequent liability, presses can again be motivated by the government to
suppress a speaker's communication prior to its publication and distribu-
tion. In the context of a technology intermediary, such as presses and web
hosts, collateral censorship takes the form of an actual, physical restraint
on speech. It is not that the press cows the speaker into silence with a
threat. Rather, the speech is cut off unilaterally by the press even over the
objectives of the speaker. This violates the speaker's most fundamental
freedom granted by the Free Press Clause-freedom from prior restraint.
This result seems intuitively wrong in the classic publisher scenario, in
which an editor sits with an author to edit and review a work, and a pub-
lisher employs a fact-checking department to make sure that a work is
correct and up to the publisher's standards. But this concern can be
abated by abandoning the labels of speaker, publisher, and distributor. In
the context of the Free Press Clause, there are speakers and presses. And
sometimes a party can be both.
Channeling Balkin and Wu, when a publisher and an author are en-
gaged in a collective endeavor, are both speaking, or are literally the
same person, collateral censorship is not a problem because in those situ-
ations the publisher is acting as both a speaker and a press. Because the
publisher has the same motivations as the speaker, collateral censorship is
not a significant concern.
In contrast, self-publishing houses, bookstores, newsstands, and web-
sites such as YouTube.com or Blogger.com, are not acting as speakers
when they print, distribute, or host others' content. They are acting solely
as presses. They may make some choices about the content they dis-
tribute, just as the bookstore can choose what books to carry, and the
host or the self-publishing house can limit, for whatever reasons, the kind
of content it disseminates. But because they are not actively engaged in
creating and editing the speech, they should not be liable as speakers.
Aside from when a press is also acting as a speaker, there is another
circumstance where liability can appropriately be imposed on a press
without raising Free Press Clause concerns. This circumstance occurs
when a press receives actual notice that certain speech has been adjudi-
cated by a court to be illegal or unprotected.136 In these circumstances,
Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011); Balkin, supra note 54, at 2297; Meyerson, supra note 50,
at 80; Wu, supra note 48, at 394.
135. Smith, 361 U.S. at 147; Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137; Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL
323710, at *1; Balkin, supra note 54, at 2297; Meyerson, supra note 50, at 80; Wu, supra
note 48, at 394.
136. This proposal was inspired by Michael 1. Meyerson's suggestion for common car-
rier liability, which he drew from an FCC rule. Meyerson suggested, "Carriers who by law
or contract serve only as 'conduits' for the speech of others [shlould only be responsible for
distributing the speech of another if they have 'actual notice' that the speech has previously
been adjudicated illegal or unprotected." Meyerson, supra note 50, at 122.
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because the underlying speaker has no right to make the speech, and be-
cause there is no risk of overbroad censoring, liability on presses will not
violate the Free Press Clause. This liability might be styled as "modified
distributor liability." Whereas traditional distributor liability merely re-
quires notice that speech is illegal, modified distributor liability would
require notice that a court had judged the speech to be illegal or
unprotected.
Granting greater protection to presses than to speakers initially seems
perverse. It is the speaker who is adding her voice to the world, and yet
she is subject to greater sanction by the government than the technologies
that copy and spread the speech. However, it is only by granting immu-
nity to speech technologies that speakers exercising their free press rights
will enjoy the same degree of freedom of expression as those exercising
their rights to engage in person-to-person speech under the Free Speech
Clause.
V. "NOTICE-AND-TAKEDOWN," COPYRIGHT, AND
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
A. COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Although equity will not enjoin a libel, courts will enjoin a copyright
violation.137 The copyright statute plainly permits courts to "grant tempo-
rary and final injunctions . . . to prevent or restrain infringement of a
copyright."138 Considering the longstanding ban on prior restraints of
speech, the availability of not just final, but also preliminary injunctions,
in copyright cases is curious. Often when people use others' copyrighted
works, they use them to communicate. This is particularly the case with
derivative works, where an author uses part or all of a copyrighted work
to make a new work. Yet, even highly expressive, new works are some-
times suppressed. In 2009, the Southern District of New York enjoined
the dissemination of an entire novel because it was an unauthorized se-
quel to J.D. Salinger's Catcher in the Rye.139 The book cannot be distrib-
uted in the United States to this day.140
Indeed, despite the promise of liberty of the press in England and the
First Amendment in American law, preliminary injunctions in copyright
137. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006).
138. Id.
139. See Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d
68 (2d Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit vacated the trial court's decision in Salinger because
they had issued a preliminary injunction under the standard used for copyright cases in the
Second Circuit prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC,
547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006). 607 F.3d at 74-75, 84. In light of eBay, the Second Circuit vacated
the injunction, but saw "no reason to disturb the District Court's conclusion . . . that Salin-
ger is likely to succeed on the merits of his copyright infringement claim." Id. at 83. Several
months later, Colting settled the case, agreeing to a permanent injunction of the book in
the United States. See Permanent Injunction and Final Order on Consent at 1, Salinger v.
Colting, No. 09-CIV-05095-DAB (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010), ECF No. 55.
140. See Permanent Injunction and Final Order on Consent at 1, Salinger v. Colting,
No. 09-CIV-05095-DAB (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010), ECF No. 55.
2013]1 175
SMU LAW REVIEW
cases have been commonplace since the early days of copyright in En-
gland and throughout most of the United States' history, except during
the first fifty years or so of the nation's existence. 141 The Supreme Court
has repeatedly expressed comfort treating copyright cases as distinct from
other cases implicating expressive values.142 In Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Court explained "that copyright's idea/ex-
pression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of
facts while still protecting an author's expression.' . . . [T]he Framers in-
tended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression."' 4 3 In the 2003
decision Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court clarified how it perceived the rela-
tionship between copyright and the First Amendment. 144 "The Copyright
Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity
indicates that, in the Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies are
compatible with free speech principles."1 45 According to the Court, copy-
right law contains "built-in First Amendment accommodations" including
the idea/expression distinction and the fair use defense.146 These safe-
guards are "generally adequate" to address First Amendment concerns in
copyright law.147 "[F]urther First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary"
where "Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection. "148
It is unclear whether the "traditional contours" language actually
means that the Court will recognize limits to the copyright power.149 In
the 2012 decision Golan v. Holder, the Court held that extending copy-
right protection to works already in the public domain would not violate
the traditional contours of copyright.150 Golan described the traditional
contours of copyright protection as being the idea/expression dichotomy
and the fair use defense,15 implying that no copyright law could violate
the First Amendment unless one or the other were eliminated.
Despite the Supreme Court's apparent belief that copyright law is con-
sistent with the First Amendment, the relationship between copyright law
141. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellec-
tual Property Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147, 151-58 (1998). Lemley and Volokh argued that
preliminary injunctions should be more limited in copyright cases, for the same reasons
that motivate the ban on injunctions in other speech cases. Id. at 209-10. Specifically, Lem-
ley and Volokh argue that ex parte temporary restraining orders should always be forbid-
den and that preliminary injunctions should be prohibited "in cases involving nonliteral
copying." Id. at 210.
142. Id. at 158-59.
143. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556, 558 (1985)
(quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir.
1983)).
144. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221-22 (2003).
145. Id. at 219.
146. Id. at 219-20.
147. Id. at 221.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890-91 (2012).
151. Id.
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and technologies of mass communication, or presses, has yet to be explic-
itly explored by the Court.152 The Court stated in Eldred, "copyright's
limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles." 153 But
even if the general grant of exclusive rights to copyright owners is beyond
the First Amendment, whether presses and online service providers can
be regulated in the name of copyright protection is a different issue be-
cause restraints on technologically intermediaries have effects far beyond
the area of speech they aim to regulate. A regulatory regime that re-
quired printers to have a license from the government would be a prior
restraint on the press, regardless of whether the purpose of the licensing
regime was to ensure copyrights were respected or that obscenity was not
published. Because the law would require all printers to acquire a license,
all unlicensed publishing, no matter how harmless, would be illegal. Such
regulations of technological intermediaries are also substantially over-
broad: by seeking to curtail one kind of speech or content, they end up
curtailing many others. 154 Thus a regulation of technologies of mass com-
munication should rarely be deemed constitutional. While the purpose of
a regulation may be purely to protect copyrights, the effects will often
have substantial implications for speech that do not fall into the "copy-
right exception" to traditional First Amendment reasoning.
A number of recent additions to the Copyright Act are aimed at tech-
nology intermediaries, rather than copyright infringers directly. The Au-
dio Home Recording Act, passed in 1992, required producers of digital
audio recording devices to incorporate the Serial Copy Management Sys-
tem, a type of copy protection, into their products and forbade circum-
vention of the system.155 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), signed into law in 1998, took the direct regulation of techno-
logical intermediaries further.156 The anti-circumvention provisions pro-
hibit circumventing a technical protection mechanism (TPM)157 that
controls access to a copyrighted work and creating tools to facilitate
152. Id.
153. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 190.
154. "A law may be invalidated as overbroad if 'a substantial number of its applications
are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."' United
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)).
155. 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a), (c) (2006).
156. Id. § 1201(a)-(b).
157. TPMs act like fences around content that control who can access the material and
how the material can be used. TPMs can require an owner to type in a password or code to
access material, or can "tether" a device or piece of content to another computer on the
internet that is controlled by the copyright owner. "Tethered" works have to "call home"
and check with another source to determine whether access is permitted before granting it
to a user. (iTunes movies have this characteristic. In order to play a rented movie, the
account that purchased it must be signed in to iTunes. When a person signs in, his or her
computer connects to Apple, and Apple's computers validate the account's password, per-
mitting the movie to be played.) TPMs can also limit functionality, such as by preventing
someone from printing a paper copy of an ebook, or by only allowing someone to access a
work for a certain period of time. See JONATHAN ZTrRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE IN-




B. NOTICE-AND-TAKEDOWN AS COLLATERAL CENSORSHIP
The DMCA also included a section, codified as 17 U.S.C. § 512, which
provides some immunity to internet and online service providers that
transmit copyrighted material over the internet, store copyright infringing
material at the direction of a user, or link to infringing material.159 In
order to qualify for the § 512 safe harbor, those who store or link to con-
tent must "not have actual knowledge" of particular acts of infringement,
be unaware of "facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent," and "act[ ] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material" when they gain such knowledge or awareness.160 The service
provider must also not "receive a financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activity" nor have "the right and ability to control" the in-
fringing activity.161 In other words, § 512 immunizes hosts such as You-
Tube, which often display copyright-infringing content uploaded by a
user, and search engines such as Google that link to content containing
copyright infringing material.
In return for this immunity, service providers must remove allegedly-
infringing material or links if asked.162 In the case of a service provider,
such as YouTube, that stores material at the direction of users, the pro-
vider must notify the user that material has been taken down.163 A user
then has the option to give "counter-notice" that the material is not in-
fringing, in which case the material can be restored.'6" Notably, search
engines do not have to notify parties that their material has been re-
moved from the engine's search index, and the DMCA does not articu-
late any counter-notification procedures for restoring links.165
Section 512 bears some resemblance to distributor liability rules and to
§ 230 of the CDA, which itself does not grant immunity for publishing
copyright-infringing content.166 However, unlike in § 230, intermediaries
may be liable if they continue to host or link to content after receiving
notice that it is allegedly infringing.167 As with distributors, online service
providers are not required to comb through the material they host on
others' behalf in search of copyright violations.'18 This distributor-style
158. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b).
159. Id. § 512.
160. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A).
161. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
162. Id. § 512(c).
163. Id. § 512(g).
164. Id. § 512(g).
165. See id. § 512(g) (specifying restoration and counter-notification procedures for ma-
terial stored with a service provider, but not for material discoverable through informa-
tion-location tools).
166. Section 230 provides, "Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand
any law pertaining to intellectual property." 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
168. Id.
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immunity is particularly deserved in the case of copyright infringement
because a host cannot tell from viewing content alone whether it is in-
fringing. Material is only copyright-infringing if the owner has not given
permission for it to be copied. As a result, identical content uploaded by
two different parties could be legal in one case and copyright-infringing in
another. While there are certainly some hallmark characteristics of in-
fringement, requiring a service provider to independently determine
whether everything it hosts is not infringing would require cripplingly
burdensome factual investigations. YouTube, for instance, would have to
determine whether the contents of every video was copyrighted by some-
one other than the uploader, ask uploaders whether they have permission
to use the content, and possibly locate and ask original copyright owners
if uploaders could not sufficiently verify their claimed rights. If bookstore
owners cannot read every book to determine if they are obscene, You-
Tube's employees cannot check every video for potential copyright in-
fringement. Indeed, it would be mathematically impossible-
approximately seventy-two hours of new video are uploaded to You-
Tube.com every minute. 169
The circumstances that led to § 512's passage were quite different than
those that led to § 230. Arguably, even without § 230, courts would have
developed sensible rules about online service providers and tortious
speech. Cubby construed CompuServe as a distributor rather than a pub-
lisher, despite the fact that it did recopy the allegedly defamatory
speech. 170 Traditionally, "re-publishing" would have subjected a party to
publisher liability. 171 But the Cubby court sensibly realized that, at least
on the Internet, copying was not the sine qua non of publishing.172
Section 512 developed due to content providers pushing a different
conception of liability in a copyright infringement context. Although
Cubby recognized that the recopying of content on different computers
did not necessarily qualify as "re-publishing," the Ninth Circuit held in
1993 that a digital copy in a computer's random access memory (RAM)
constituted prima facie copyright infringement.1 73 The Ninth Circuit's de-
cision, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., was very controver-
sial.174 However, when Bill Clinton's Working Group on Intellectual
Property released its White Paper suggesting changes to the copyright
statute in 1995, the paper expressed the view that the MAI Systems hold-
ing reflected a noncontroversial and correct interpretation of the law. 175
According to the White Paper, any unauthorized, digital use of a copy-
righted work constituted infringement because loading a digital copy into
169. Statistics, YouTUBE.COM, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.htm (last vis-
ited May 9, 2013).
170. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
171. Id. at 139.
172. Id. at 140.
173. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993).
174. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 91, 96 (2006).
175. Id. at 94-95.
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a computer's RAM was actionable under the copyright statute.176 As a
result, the White Paper argued that copyright owners had the right to con-
trol whether and how someone read, listened to, or viewed a digital work,
even though copyright did not allow copyright holders to exert the same
control over the use of non-digital works.177
The White Paper and MAI Systems were a problem for internet and
online service providers.' 78 Internet service providers constantly make
copies as they transmit data over the Internet.179 Similarly, hosting ser-
vices feared they would be directly liable for the copyright-infringing ac-
tions of their users.180 When it became clear that the DMCA would not
pass without the support of internet and online service providers and tele-
phone companies, content providers and service providers negotiated the
inclusion of § 512.181
Due to the controversy over the copyright-infringing status of digital
copies, the immunity granted to technology intermediaries in § 512 may
never have developed in the case law. Arguably, § 512 has provided a
great benefit to service providers compared to the likely alternatives in
the absence of any immunity-granting legislation. Nonetheless, § 512 puts
in place an incentive system that results in the exact kind of collateral
censorship that raises Free Press Clause concerns.
The notion that § 512 violates the Free Press Clause finds support in
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan.182 Ban-
tam Books considered a Rhode Island statute that created a commission
directed "to educate the public concerning any [literature] ... containing
obscene, indecent or impure language, or manifestly tending to ... cor-
rupt[ ]" the young.' 83 When a majority of the Commission's members de-
clared a book objectionable, it would "notify a distributor on official
Commission stationery that certain designated books or magazines dis-
tributed by him had been reviewed" and declared objectionable.184 A dis-
tributor was also notified that "[c]opies of the lists of 'objectionable'
publications were circulated to local police departments."1 85 Although no
books were seized or banned and no person prosecuted, the Court ob-
176. See, e.g., INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 65-66 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER],
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/. For an alternate theory of
how digital copies should be treated by copyright law, see Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing
RAM Copies, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1067, 1087-1107 (2010).
177. LITMAN, supra note 174, at 94-95 (citing WHITE PAPER, supra note 176, at
19-130).
178. Id. at 93 (describing the reaction of online service providers to the Green Paper,
the draft that was revised to become the White Paper).
179. Id. at 95.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 127-28, 134-35.
182. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1963).
183. Id. at 59.
184. Id. at 61.
185. Id. at 62-63.
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served that "the Commission deliberately set about to achieve the sup-
pression of publications" through "the threat of invoking legal sanctions
and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation."18 6 Although
the distributor was "'free' to ignore the Commission's notices, in the
sense that his refusal to 'cooperate' would have violated no law[,] . . .
[p]eople do not lightly disregard public officers' thinly veiled threats to
institute criminal proceedings against them."' 87 The Court expressed con-
cern about the way the Commission's system "obviat[ed]" the criminal
process and eliminated "the safeguards of the criminal process."t 8s It fi-
nally concluded that Rhode Island had
subject[ed] the distribution of publications to a system of prior ad-
ministrative restraints, since the Commission [was] not a judicial
body and . . . [did] not follow judicial determinations that such publi-
cations may lawfully be banned... . [The Court had previously] tol-
erated such a system only where it operated under judicial
superintendence and assured an almost immediate judicial determi-
nation of the validity of [such a] restraint. 89
Section 512 immunizes service providers if they remove content as
soon as they receive notice, properly given under the terms of the stat-
ute.190 Although notice-givers can theoretically face liability for know-
ingly misrepresenting that content is infringing,191 in practice these suits
are rare and the "knowing" standard is difficult to meet.192 As a result,
there is very little motivation for a person not to send a takedown notice
for content they do not like. Although the notice-and-takedown system's
purpose was to take down possible copyright violations, the lack of proce-
dural safeguards or punishment for sending completely bogus notices
means that in practice, notices can be issued for entirely speech-sup-
pressing purposes.
Just as the book distributor in Bantam Books responded to the Com-
mission's notices, so too do online service providers respond to individu-
alized takedown notices. Although the service providers are free to
ignore the notices, they open themselves up to liability if they do.193 The
notice-and-takedown system similarly obviates the safeguards for speech
in actually bringing a copyright infringement lawsuit. Although courts
grant preliminary injunctions in copyright cases quite freely, the process
is still tremendously more speech-protective than the notice-and-take-
down system. As a threshold matter, to obtain a preliminary injunction
against the hosting of copyrighted content, the copyright owner would
need to make a prima facie showing that she owned the copyright to the
186. Id. at 67.
187. Id. at 68.
188. Id. at 70.
189. Id.
190. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
191. Id. § 512(f).
192. See Seltzer, supra note 59, at 221-25.
193. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(c).
2013]1 181
SMU LAW REVIEW
content being hosted.194 This safeguard alone would prevent almost all of
the takedown notices sent that are completely bogus and unrelated to any
arguably copyright-infringing behavior.
Because procedural safeguards are largely absent, bogus notices are
commonplace. For example, in late 2011, when the public was debating
the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), blogger Michael Masnick
wrote a blog post about why SOPA should not be passed.195 He later
discovered that the post had been removed from Google's search re-
sults. 1 9 6 The "anti-piracy" firm Armovore, on behalf of a pornography
company, Paper Street Cash, had sent a notice to Google, asking for it to
remove the link to Masnick's webpage, supposedly because the page was
infringing Paper Street Cash's copyrights. 197 As previously discussed,
Google did not have any legal obligation to notify Masnick that the link
to his page had been removed. 198 There was nothing even arguably in-
fringing in the post or user comments, and Google eventually put the blog
post back in its search index.199 After Masnick wrote about the take-
down, Armovore reached out to "'accept full responsibility for the mis-
take' and insist that while that takedown was an automated keyword-
based effort, they now only do manual takedowns." 200 Masnick accepted
the takedown as an honest mistake, rather than as an attempt to silence
his opposition to SOPA.201
But perhaps the clearest examples of how the notice-and-takedown
system can be abused are from the past two presidential elections. In mid-
July of 2012, Mitt Romney put a campaign ad on YouTube, criticizing
President Obama's relationship with campaign donors. 202 The ad juxta-
posed a clip of Obama singing one line from Al Green's song, "Let's Stay
Together," with news headlines describing Obama's rewarding of cam-
paign donors and lobbyists.203 The "Let's Stay Together" music publisher,
BMG, issued a takedown notice for the video, and it was automatically
194. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2010).
195. Mike Masnick, Key Techdirt SOPAIPIPA Post Censored by Bogus DMCA Take-





198. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (specifying restoration and counter-notification procedures
for material stored with a service provider, but not for material discoverable through infor-
mation-location tools).
199. Mike Masnick, Company That Issued Bogus Takedown Notice Says It Was All a





202. See Political Payoffs and Middle Class Layoffs, YouTUBE (July 16, 2012), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=giajeW6xPnl.
203. Id.; Timothy B. Lee, Music Publisher Uses DMCA to Take Down Romney Ad of
Obama Crooning, ARs TECHNICA (July 16, 2012, 6:59 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/07/major-label-uses-dmca-to-take-down-romney-ad-of-obama-crooning/.
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removed.204 The takedown appeared to be politically motivated because
many copies of original videos of Obama singing the song at first re-
mained visible. 2 0 5 But, as Mike Masnick snarked, "[i]t appears that some-
one pointed out to BMG's lawyers that this looks really bad," and
takedowns were issued to the original videos as well.2 06 Just two days
later, YouTube took the unusual step of restoring all of the videos, 207
despite the fact that under the DMCA, it would lose legal immunity if it
did not keep the videos down for at least ten days following a
counternotice. 2 08
YouTube's decision was a departure from its behavior four years prior,
when John McCain campaign ads were taken down. 209 The McCain cam-
paign had used news clips in their ads, and takedown notices were issued
by CBS, Fox, NBC, and the Christian Broadcasting Network. 210 Even af-
ter receiving a counternotice from the McCain campaign claiming fair
use, YouTube was required to keep the video down for a minimum of ten
days to retain its immunity from suit.2 11 So when the McCain campaign
pleaded with YouTube to restore the video sooner, YouTube responded
in a detailed letter, explaining:
Because of the DMCA's structure, an abusive takedown notice may
result in the restriction of non-infringing speech during the statutory
10-day waiting period....
Some have suggested that YouTube mitigate abuse by performing
a substantive legal review of every DMCA notice we receive prior to
processing a takedown. For a number of reasons, this is not a viable
solution.... [A] detailed substantive review of every DMCA notice
is simply not possible due to the scale of YouTube's operations....
No number of lawyers could possibly determine with a reasonable
level of certainty whether all the videos for which we receive dis-
puted takedown notices qualify as fair use.
More importantly, YouTube does not possess the requisite infor-
mation about the content of user-uploaded videos to make a deter-
mination as to whether a particular takedown notice includes a valid
claim of infringement. The claimant and the uploader, not YouTube,
hold all of the relevant information in this regard, including the ac-
tual source of any content used, the ownership rights to that content,
204. Lee, supra note 203.
205. Mike Masnick, Even Obama Is a Pirate: BMG Issues New Takedown on Original




207. Steve Friess, YouTube Restores Romney's Ad Despite Rights Claim, POLITICO
(July 19, 2012, 4:07 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78739.html.
208. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C) (2006).
209. See Seltzer, supra note 59, at 171-73.
210. Id. at 172.
211. Id. at 172-73.
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and any licensing arrangements in place between the parties. 212
Although YouTube made an exception for Mitt Romney in 2012, back
in 2008, it claimed that restoring the McCain campaign's ad early, while
not investigating other potential abuses, simply would not be fair.213 "We
try to be careful not to favor one category of content on our site over
others, and to treat all of our users fairly, regardless of whether they are
an individual, a large corporation or a candidate for public office." 214
YouTube's letter summarizes the problem with subjecting speech in-
termediaries like YouTube to liability for their user's copyright infringe-
ment. Because YouTube cannot check each video, its only viable business
option is to take down every video when a takedown notice is received,
no matter how spurious the accusation. Moreover, uploaded videos often
do not even include enough information for YouTube to determine
whether copyright infringement occurred without knowing what content
is copyrighted or licensed by whom. Although a user can get a video re-
stored between ten and fourteen days after sending a counternotice, un-
less the original notifier seeks a court order against the alleged
infringer,215 the content is still restrained for a substantial period of time.
From the perspective of potential to restrain speech, the DMCA cer-
tainly appears to create the same harms as distributor liability. It creates
the same incentives as the Commission did in Bantam Books, except in-
stead of a commission, Congress and copyright owners together force in-
termediaries to censor their users or risk their business. Although
intermediaries would likely be threatened with civil copyright suits in-
stead of criminal prosecution, the distinction is irrelevant to the First
Amendment. The Court explained in the libel case, New York Times v.
Sullivan, "[w]hat a State may not constitutionally bring about by means
of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.
The fear of damage awards ... may be markedly more inhibiting than the
fear of prosecution under a criminal statute." 216
C. USING THE FREE PRESS CLAUSE TO PROTECT INTERMEDIARIES
FROM COPYRIGHT LIABILITY
"[I]nformal censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publi-
cations to warrant injunctive relief." 217 Notice-and-Takedown creates
precisely this type of informal censorship. Yet, the Supreme Court has
been clear that copyright law is not generally subject to First Amendment
challenges, despite numerous scholars' attempts to argue for a greater
212. Letter from Zahavah Levine, Chief Counsel, YouTube, to Trevor Potter, Gen.
Counsel, McCain-Palin 2008, at 1-2 (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://wendy.seltzer.org/
medialyoutube-letter-20081014.pdf.
213. Id. at 2-3.
214. Id.
215. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C) (2006).
216. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (footnote omitted).
217. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963).
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role for the First Amendment in copyright. 218
Nevertheless, there is room within the Supreme Court's existing juris-
prudence to argue that the Free Press Clause compels a different result
for copyright-related laws that target presses and their equivalents, rather
than original speakers. Harper & Row, Eldred, and Golan all dealt with
cases involving the scope of the exclusive rights granted in the copyright
statute.219 They involved portions of the copyright statute that affected
what speakers could do, and did not involve parts of the law that targeted
technologies of mass communication, such as presses or websites.220
The Eldred majority stated, "in the Framers' view, copyright's limited
monopolies are compatible with free speech principles." 2 21 And as a gen-
eral matter, this is correct. But the long relationship between copyright's
limited monopolies and liberty of the press suggests that the Framers be-
lieved copyright law could not be used to regulate the printing press and
channels of mass communication.222 While the exclusive monopolies of
copyright are generally constitutional, the relationship between recent
technology-focused additions to the copyright statute and the Free Press
Clause are a very different matter.
Indeed, as Edward Lee pithily explained, "Copyright was born with
freedom of the press, not against it."223 The history of copyright in En-
gland shows that, rather than copyright being an exception to the notion
of free speech, the replacement of press licensing with copyright allowed
for the birth of liberty of the press as we understand it today.224
In the seventeenth century, England restricted the number of printing
presses and required presses to be licensed by the government. 225 The
Printing Act of 1662 explicitly limited the number of master printers in
England to twenty and the number of presses each master printer could
own to two.2 2 6 Notable figures at the time championed the notion of "lib-
erty of the press" throughout the period, including Samuel Hartlib, John
Lilburne, Henry Robinson, and William Walwyn.227 John Milton, a one-
time censor, advocated for unlicensed printing "that left truth to be
sorted out in debate." 228 John Locke and Daniel Defoe also argued for a
218. See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT's PARADOX (2008); Jack M.
Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the
Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2004); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 141; Selt-
zer, supra note 59; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine
Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
219. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 891 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
219 (2003); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985).
220. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 873; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
541-42.
221. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
222. Lee, supra note 2, at 329.
223. Id. at 330.
224. Id. at 318.
225. Id. at 322-23.
226. Id. at 323.
227. Id. at 324; Meyerson, supra note 20, at 303-04.
228. Lee, supra note 2, at 324; see also LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN His-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 114 (1968).
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system of authors' rights in their works, rather than for continued regula-
tion of the presses.229
When the last Printing Act lapsed in 1695, the Stationers (guild mem-
bers who'd held a monopoly on printing) fruitlessly campaigned for regu-
lation of presses to be restored, citing the evils of "literary piracy" as
justification.230 Meyerson argues that the "reasons given for permitting
the licensing law to lapse were far more practical than philosophical,"
citing the licensing system's ineffectiveness and the licensors' tendency to
succumb to bribery.231 In contrast, historian Adrian Johns states that in
letting the Printing Act lapse, Parliament "saw itself as upholding Protes-
tant liberty and countering monopolies." 2 3 2 According to Johns, Locke's
"arguments played a major role in the Commons' debates surrounding
the [Printing Act], repudiat[ing] it not only for imposing licensing-which
he, like Milton, saw as a legacy of popery-but for fostering
monopolies." 2 3 3
Regardless of Parliament's motivations, "the expiration of the [Print-
ing] Licensing Act quickly became perceived as a monumental victory for
freedom of the press." 234 Those who had benefited from the Printing Act
continued to campaign for a revival of the licensing system, or for some
substitute regime.235 In 1710, Parliament enacted what is retroactively
recognized as the first copyright act, granting authors an exclusive right to
publish their works for fourteen years, renewable for another fourteen, or
twenty-one years if a book was already in print.2 36 England's first copy-
right law was effectively a less-restrictive alternative to the restraints that
had previously existed on the printing press.237
The creation of copyright law thus allowed freedom of the press to take
hold.2 3 8 Although eliminating printer licensing created the opportunity
for increased literary piracy, other values, later labeled as freedom of
speech and of the press, came to trump concerns about piracy.2 3 9 Black-
stone, for instance, famously described the right in his commentaries.240
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the
press, but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he
must take the consequence of his own temerity. To subject the press to
the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done, both before and
229. Lee, supra note 2, at 325.
230. Id.
231. Meyerson, supra note 20, at 305.
232. ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY 42 (2009).
233. Id.
234. Meyerson, supra note 20, at 305.
235. JOHNs, supra note 232.
236. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710). The statute also preserved the "printing
patent," a right to publish a work that was granted by the sovereign. Id.; PATTERSON, supra
note 228, at 78-80, 143.
237. Lee, supra note 2, at 318.
238. See id. at 330 ("Copyright was born with freedom of the press, not against it.").
239. Id. at 319.
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since the revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the
prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of
all controverted points in learning, religion, and government. 2 4 1
In light of the Printing Acts' relationship to the Stationers' Company,
Blackstone's commentary has important implications for regulations of
technology-namely, that prior restraints are problematic, regardless of
whether the purpose of the law is to prevent sedition, blasphemy, libel, or
"literary piracy." Blackstone did not appear to recognize a distinction be-
tween regulations to prevent piracy and to prohibit other kinds of speech.
The relationship between copyright and freedom of the press continued
to be visible during the founding era of the United States.242 Prior to the
addition of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution, Antifederalists feared
that the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" 243
would grant Congress the power to curtail freedom of the press.244 Anti-
federalist Robert Whitehill noted his concern: "Congress [will] have a
power to destroy liberty of the press . . . . They have a power to secure to
authors the right of their writings. Under this, they may license the press,
... and under licensing the press, they may suppress it."245 Federalist
James Iredell countered that an amendment protecting freedom of the
press was unnecessary because "Congress will have no other authority
over [liberty of the press] than to secure to authors for a limited time an
exclusive privilege of publishing their works." 246
Whether or not Congress would have had the power to regulate presses
under the Copyright Clause in the absence of the Bill of Rights, the argu-
ment over the Copyright Clause illustrates that the Free Press Clause was
conceived of as having the potential to limit the measures proposed in the
name of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science." 2 4 7 The Copyright Clause
grants Congress the power to "secur[e] for limited Times to Authors ...
the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings." 248 Although granting exclusive
rights to authors was viewed as consistent with the First Amendment,
other types of regulations on copying technologies-such as licensing
printers in the name of curtailing copyright infringement-were plainly
incompatible with freedom of the press. 2 4 9
241. Id. (footnote omitted).
242. Lee, supra note 2, at 331-32.
243. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
244. Lee, supra note 2, at 334.
245. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES, PENNSYLVANIA 454 (Merrill Jensen
ed., 1976) (cited in Lee, supra note 2, at 334).
246. JAMES IREDELL, ANSWERS TO MR. MASON'S OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITU-
TION (1788), in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 360-61 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., Brooklyn 1888), available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1670/
Ford_1338.pdf (cited in Lee, supra note 2, at 335).
247. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
248. Id.
249. Edward Lee has argued elsewhere that the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
violates the Free Press Clause, and that the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA
present a more difficult case. See Edward Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies: How The
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The DMCA's notice-and-takedown system is also a regulation of the
press that goes beyond the grants of exclusive rights that are consistent
with the First Amendment. Just as intermediary liability can motivate col-
lateral censorship in other contexts, the notice-and-takedown system cre-
ates incentives to silence protected, non-copyright-infringing speech
without due process. Because of these incentives, the constitutionally ap-
propriate treatment of speech-disseminating technologies should be iden-
tical whether the target of regulation is copyright infringement or other
regulable speech. Specifically, service providers should be immune from
liability for carrying another speaker's copyright infringing-content, un-
less given notice that the content has been adjudicated infringing by a
court.
VI. CONCLUSION
To protect the rights of speakers using technologies of mass communi-
cation and avoid the pernicious effects of collateral censorship, in-
termediaries utilizing communication technologies must be largely
immune from both prior and subsequent punishment for disseminating
illegal speech. Only then will the rights of person-to-person speakers, act-
ing under the Free Speech Clause, be coextensive with the rights of
speakers using technology to spread their ideas under the Free Press
Clause.
Specifically, several changes to the law must be made. First, publisher
and distributor liability must be jettisoned, in favor of a rubric that asks
whether a party is a speaker or a press. Parties that are only acting as
presses, whether online or elsewhere, must be granted immunity for dis-
seminating speech unless it has been adjudicated illegal or unprotected by
a court. Second, the Supreme Court must acknowledge that regulations
of speech-disseminating technologies in the name of copyright protection
can run afoul of the Free Press Clause due to their censoring effect on
non-copyright-infringing speech.
Right to Bear Arms Affects Copyright Regulations of Speech Technologies, 17 WM. &
MAy BILL RTS. J. 1037, 1079-81, 1084-87 (2009).
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